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ARGUMENT
State

v.

Samuel, No. 441 82, Does Not Mandate

Berry appeals from the judgment entered
unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm.
discretion

When

it

He

A New Trial In This Case

after a jury

found Berry guilty of grand

argued in his opening brief that the

overruled his Rule 403 objection Without detailing

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-1

1.)

In response, the state explained

Why the

district court

theft

and

abused

its

balancing 0n the record.

its

cases 0n which Berry relied

did not support his argument. (Resp. brief, pp.14-15.) Berry cited in reply State V. Samuel, N0.

44182,

ﬁled

(Idaho Sept. 11, 2019), a case decided

slip 0p.

m

brief, pp. 10-12),

First,

killed his brother

SaLuel does not mandate a new

Samuel was

his

trial in this

and his

father.

m,

No. 441 82,

afraid of his father.

Li. at 31.

district court sustained the objection

The

after the state

(m

Rule 403 objection

ﬂ

case for two reasons.

does not support the proposition for Which Berry cites

He

slip op. at 2-3.

it.

In that case,

Samuel

argued t0 the jury that he

mother whether she had ever seen

killed his father in self—defense. Li. at 3. His counsel asked his

if

Supreme Court

the Idaho

Even assuming Berry properly preserved

its initial brief.

Resp.

by

on relevance grounds.

state objected

“based upon the fact that there

The

Li.

already independent

is

evidence in the record of his fear of his father” so the “answer would be more prejudicial than
probative.”

Li.

After ﬁrst observing that “[t]he only evidence

Samuel’s confession,” the Idaho Supreme Court held that the

when

it

“did not suggest what ‘independent evidence’

stating that the probative value [was]

it

.

.

.

at that

point in the

abused

district court

was

referring t0

9”

outweighed by unfair prejudice [was]

its

trial

was

discretion

because “[s]imply

insufficient.”

Li. at

32-33.

The best reading 0f Samuel
only

when the reasoning cannot be

is

that a district court

inferred

must explain

its

reasoning on the record

from the record. The Samuel court went out 0f its way

to note that

it

could not infer the

“what ‘independent evidence’

reasoning from the record because

district court’s

[the district court]

the mother’s testimony cumulative.

I_d.

was

In fact, the

at 32.

999

m

referring t0

When

m

confession.”

that

d0

I_d.

.

.

at that

tell

the district court found

on the appellate court’s

point in the

was Samuel’s

trial

at 32.

is

thus consistent with the plethora 0f decisions from Idaho and elsewhere holding

an appellate court should infer the

so.

.

could not

court observed that the record

actually contradicted the district court’s decision because, based

independent review 0f the record, “[t]he only evidence

it

district court’s

reasoning from the record

when

it

can

fairly

E, gg, State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 609-10, 434 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2019) (holding

“the district court did not abuse

its

discretion

.

.

.

despite articulating a rationale inconsistent With

relevant legal authority” because the appellate court could infer from the “context” that the district

court also relied 0n a proper, unarticulated rationale); State V. Floyd, 159 Idaho 370, 372, 360 P.3d

379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e should examine the record t0 determine implicit ﬁndings which

would support
977-78

(Ct.

the

trial

App. 201

court’s order.”); State V. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870-71,

1)

(holding “district court did not err in failing to conduct a Rule 403

balancing test on the record” because the record showed no unfair prejudice);1
States V. Repak,

264 P.3d 975,

852 F.3d 230, 246-47 (3d

Cir.

2017) (encouraging

ﬂ alﬂ

district courts to

403 balancing 0n the record but afﬁrming even Without such analysis because

“it is

M

conduct Rule

‘apparent from

the record’ that the prejudicial effect 0f the Government’s evidence does not substantially

outweigh the probative value of that evidence”); United States

1

Accord

State V. Yearslev,

No. 46052,

slip op. at

(rejecting “assertion that [the defendant]

is

V.

Breton, 740 F.3d

1,

14 (lst Cir.

7-8 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2019) (unpublished)

entitled t0 a

new trial based solely 0n the district court’s

1162197,

at

WL

403 reasoning”); State V. Ruggiero, No. 43726, 2017
*5 (Idaho Ct. App. March 29, 2017) (unpublished) (afﬁrming evidentiary ruling where

failure to expressly articulate its I.R.E.

the district court “implicitly engaged in the I.R.E. 403 balancing test” (emphasis added».

2014) (“We give great deference to a
prejudice

.

.

district

judge’s balancing 0f probative value versus unfair

even When a judge does not expressly explain the Rule 403 balancing process 0n the

.

record”); United States V. Akhigbe, 642 F.3d 1078, 1081-82 (D.C. Cir. 201 1) (“[A]1though the
district court

never expressly weighed the prejudicial effect 0f the evidence against

value, reversal or

remand

for failure t0

make such

a balancing 0n the record

is

its

probative

inappropriate

because the considerations germane to balancing probative value versus prejudicial effect are

Bowoto V. Chevron Com, 621 F.3d

readily apparent from the record.” (quotations omitted»;

1131 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The
recitation 0f Rule

its

16,

however, was not required t0 engage in a mechanical

403 ’s formula 0n the record as long as

the trial judge adequately

before

district court,

1 1

it

appears from the record as a Whole that

weighed the probative value and prejudicial

effect ofproffered evidence

admission.” (quotations, brackets, and ellipsis omitted»; United States V. McCourt, 468

F.3d 1088, 1092 (8th

403 weighing

is

Cir.

2006) (“[T]he

district court’s

mere

failure t0

make

not reversible error.” (quotations omitted)); United States

a record 0f

V. Carter,

208

its

F.

Rule

App’x

284, 286 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Although the court did not conduct an on-the-record balancing test

under rule 403 as Carter had requested, remand
probative value/prejudice evaluation were

no

made

is

not necessary if the factors on which the

are readily apparent

from the record, and there

is

substantial uncertainty about the correctness 0f the ruling”); United States V. Lazcano-

Villalobos, 175 F.3d 838, 846 (10th Cir. 1999)

determinations

when

(“We have

the determinations are supported

by

consistently upheld implicit Rule 403

the record”); Black V. Ryder, 15 F.3d

573, 587 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[A]n appellate court reviewing a

trial

judge’s decision t0 admit 0r

exclude evidence 0n any 0f the grounds set forth in Rule 403 will generally afﬁrm
reﬂects that there

articulated

is

any reasonable basis for the lower court’s

on the record.” (quotations omitted»; United

result,

even

States V. Hernandez,

if the

if that basis

record

was not

975 F.2d 1035, 1041

(4th Cir. 1992) (“[A]s long as the record as a

whole indicates appropriate

judicial weighing,

we

Will not reverse for a failure to recite mechanically the appropriate balancing test.” (quotations

omitted)).

Here, as the state explained in

its initial brief,

the reasons supporting the district court’s

Rule 403 decision are readily apparent in the record. (Resp.
this case

from

district court

at 32.

m,

Where the record

left

brief, pp.13-19.)

That distinguishes

how

the appellate court helpless in determining

concluded that the mother’s testimony was cumulative. SaLwcl, No. 44182,

Because the record readily reveals

was more probative than
without detailing

its

that the evidence surrounding Berry’s assault

prejudicial, the district court did not err

by admitting

the

slip 0p.

of Beverly

that evidence

Rule 403 balancing on the record.

Second, even

if

Samuel held

an abuse 0f discretion, the

that the failure to articulate reasoning

district court’s error

harmless errors. I.C.R. 52.

An “‘error is

same Without

State V.

the error.’”

(quotations omitted);

ﬂ

harmless

N0. 45629,

if the

E

slip op. at

[was] unavailing”). After

all, it

66

44 (2017)

on the record

is

8,

2019).

thus harmless if the

State V. Iverson, 155 Idaho 766, 777,

error harmless because the record

probative value” and the defendant’s

38,

3-7 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct.

682, 693 (Ct. App. 2014) (assuming the district court erred by failing to articulate

0n the record but ﬁnding the

per se

Court ﬁnds that the result would be the

failure to articulate its reasoning

record supports the district court’s decision.

is

was harmless. This Court must disregard

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

State V. Joslin,

Any error in a district court’s

here

0n the record

its

316 P.3d

403 balancing

showed “the photographs had

clear

contention that the photographs were unfairly prejudicial

would make n0 sense

t0

g0 through an entirely new

trial

With the

exact same evidence just so the district court could articulate

E

State V.

its

Rule 403 balancing on the record?

Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 867, 332 P.3d 767, 779 (2014) (“The purpose of a harmless

error rule is to block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that

have

little,

if any,

likelihood of having changed the results of the trial.” (quotations omitted)).

Here, any error in the district court’s failure to articulate
harmless.

As

trial

(E Resp. brief, pp.13-19.)

t0 the district court t0 articulate the reasons

face 0f the

record—would be a waste

Why—reasons

ofjudicial resources.

just so the district court could articulate

its

Rule 403 objection, the
result

trial

this case

that are already apparent

on the

sending this case back for a

district court’s

district court’s failure t0 detail its

of the

And

Remanding

new

balancing on the record would be a waste of

everyone’s resources. Because the record supports the

changed the

reasoning 0n the record was

the state has explained, the record supported the district court’s ruling that the

evidence was more probative than prejudicial.

back

its

decision to overrule Berry’s

balancing on the record could not have

and was therefore harmless.3

2

At most, a party Who raises on appeal the district court’s failure t0 articulate Rule 403 balancing
0n the record would be entitled to a remand so the district court could put the balancing on the
record—not a new trial. C_f. Litchﬁeld V. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 422 n.4, 835 P.2d 651, 657 n.4
(Ct. App. 1992) (“We note, however, that Where the trial court fails t0 adequately state its reasons
for granting or denying the motion for new trial, and it is not obvious from the record why the
motion was denied, the proper response on appeal is not to reverse the ruling, but t0 remand the
case to the trial judge—Who heard the evidence—to state his or her reasons for the grant or
denial.”) (citing Quick V. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 773, 727 P.2d 1187, 1201 (1986)).
3

The

state

maintains that any error was also harmless for the reasons articulated in

(E Resp. brief, pp.18-19.)

its initial brief.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Berry guilty of grand

theft

Court afﬁrm the judgment entered after a jury found

and unlawful possession 0f a ﬁrearm.

DATED this 21st day of October, 2019.
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